Impact of globalization on monetary policy : commentary by Charles Bean
Commentary: Impact of
Globalization on Monetary Policy
Like Gaul, Ken Rogoff’s paper is divided into three parts: the
impact of globalization on the inflationary process; the persistence of
volatility in asset prices despite greater macroeconomic stability; and
the consequences of increased openness for the conduct of monetary
policy. I shall say a few words on each.
If you ask the average businessperson why inflation has been low
during the past decade, he or she is almost certain to reply that it is
down to cheap imports from the Far East and Eastern Europe. Mone-
tary policy probably won’t get a look in, yet we know that inflation
must ultimately be a monetary phenomenon. The answer, of course,
is that globalization represents a shock to relative, not absolute, prices.
What happens to the general price level depends on what monetary
policy makers decide to do. But there is, as Ken notes, a grain of truth
in the popular view, in so far as the beneficial terms of trade shock
have temporarily lowered the natural rate of unemployment and
provided a favorable “tailwind” to central banks’ attempts to hold
inflation down.
But winds can be changeable, and Ken observes that the process
may go into reverse at some point. To an extent, this may already be
happening. While the Sino-Indian development miracle probably has
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some way to run, the near-tripling of oil prices over the past couple
of years and the rise in commodity prices more generally are surely in
large part a reflection of the rapid industrialization of China and the
other emerging economies. The fact that the rise in oil prices is the
flip side of the globalization shock to me renders suspect the practice
of focusing on measures of core inflation that strip out energy prices,
while retaining the falling goods prices.
The structural changes in the industrialized economies brought
about by globalization seem rather more fundamental. At this confer-
ence three years ago, Ken argued that these changes had increased the
incentive to stabilize inflation at a low level. I have no problem with
his argument that increased competitive pressures reduce the wedge
between the natural and efficient levels of output, and that this,
together with the greater role played by the exchange rate, lowers the
incentive to inflate. (Though this argument seems less relevant for
nations with independent inflation-targeting central banks than for
countries where policy is subject to political pressures.)
I am less convinced, however, that globalization will result in a
steepening of the short-run output-inflation tradeoff. Extant analyses
of the tradeoff in open economies instead suggest that the increased
specialization resulting from globalization reduces the response of
inflation to the domestic output gap and makes it more sensitive to
the world output gap, leading to a flatter tradeoff (see Gali and
Monacelli, 2005; and Razin and Yuen, 2002).
1 Moreover, increased
competition from labor-abundant economies means that businesses
have less scope to raise their prices in the face of strong demand. This
suggests that we might expect to observe greater countercyclicality in
price markups (such an effect is absent by construction in standard
New Keynesian analyses). This is exactly what Batini, Jackson, and
Nickell (2005) find. And workers have less scope to negotiate higher
earnings when faced with potential offshoring and the actual or
threatened use of migrant labor, limiting the effect of higher activity
on the marginal cost of labor.
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Ultimately, the impact of globalization on the short-run output-
inflation tradeoff must be an empirical issue, but such a flattening has
indeed been observed in a number of industrialized countries in
recent years, and appears to be related to increased openness as well
as the decline in inflation (Daniels, Nourzad, and Vanhoose, 2005).
Some recent empirical studies also find a heightened role for global
output gaps in national pricing relationships (see, for example, Borio
and Filardo, 2006).
On the face of it, this flattening of the output-inflation tradeoff
appears to be both good and bad news for policymakers. The good
news is that demand shocks and policy errors will not show up in
large deviations of inflation from target, if one starts from there. The
bad news is that if inflation starts above target, then it appears to be
more costly to get it down. When coupled with the fact that increased
capital market integration potentially reduces the central bank’s lever-
age over domestic real interest rates, it, therefore, might appear that
monetary policy is losing traction as far as the control of domestic
inflation goes.
That would be going too far. Although the transmission channel via
domestic demand might be weaker, monetary policy would still
impact the price level through the nominal exchange rate and infla-
tion expectations. But the link from interest rates to exchange rates
does not seem to be a very tight one, and we still understand relatively
little about how inflation expectations are formed. So, the impact of
policy decisions might become rather less predictable. Certainly
maintaining the high degree of inflation stability that we have seen
over the past decade may prove difficult.
Globalization also appears to have affected the way economies
respond to cost shocks. One reason why the impact of higher oil
prices has been relatively benign is that wages and prices have not
reacted in the way they did in the 1970s. In part, that may be a result
of the counterinflationary credibility of monetary policies. But it also
appears that heightened competitive pressures mean that businesses
have frequently felt unable to pass on such increases in higher prices
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and have instead looked to lower costs, by granting lower wage
increases, putting downward pressure on the costs of other inputs, or
raising efficiency. Certainly that is what our business contacts in the
United Kingdom have been telling us (see pp. 34-36, Bank of
England, 2006).
Turning to the second theme in the paper, Ken observes that the
well-documented decline in the volatility of output (and inflation)
witnessed over the past two decades or so has not been matched by
lower volatility in equity prices and exchange rates. While the jury is
still out on the relative importance of structural changes, better
monetary policy, and plain good luck, it is plausible that at least some
of the increased macroeconomic stability is connected to globaliza-
tion, in particular more complete risk shifting in better integrated
financial markets, as well as the aforementioned changes in wage and
price behavior.
But why haven’t asset prices become more stable, too? Certainly
standard theories of equity pricing might lead one to expect such an
outcome if profits have become more stable. Ken makes the neat and
original point that, as a simple matter of arithmetic, a reduction in
the rate used to discount those profits means that a given variance in
that discount rate will generate proportionately bigger swings in asset
prices. So, lower risk-free rates, and lower risk premia associated with
greater stability, might help to explain the absence of any noticeable
decline in asset price volatility as normally measured. This sort of
argument doesn’t appear capable of rationalizing the findings in
regard to the exchange rate, though.
In the coda to his paper, Ken suggests that the greatest challenge to
monetary policy during the globalization period has been this contin-
uing volatility of asset prices. My take is slightly different. I do not
think it is volatility per se that has troubled policymakers—after all,
the swings in asset prices appear to have been no greater than in earlier
periods. Rather, policymakers have at various times had to judge
whether elevated equity prices, bond prices, house prices, or exchange
rates are justified by changed fundamentals or instead are likely to
correct sharply, jeopardizing both monetary and financial stability.
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Finally, Ken tackles the more specific question of how openness
should affect the choice of target price index—or, equivalently, what
sorts of shocks justify a deviation for a given target price index. There
is already substantial theoretical literature on the appropriate choice
of target on efficiency grounds, which suggests that it hinges on the
location of the nominal rigidities in the economy—the basic princi-
ple being to seek to stabilize the prices that are relatively sticky. In the
context of an open economy, a lot then depends on how imported
goods are treated, with the majority of studies unfortunately ignoring
the pricing-to-market and slow pass-through that we observe in the
real world.
Although the theoretical debate is not yet closed, Ken suggests that
is unwise for policy to react to the exchange rate independently of its
effects on future consumer price inflation and output because it is
akin to an asset price, but there is a case for the accommodation of
terms-of-trade shocks. I believe that a concern that an asset price
boom-bust may lead to medium-term instability can still be captured
within an inflation-targeting framework if the time horizon is suit-
ably elongated (Bean, 2003). I find Ken’s first conclusion entirely
reasonable, especially given the apparent noise in exchange rate move-
ments to which he draws attention.
Most central bankers—even inflation targeters—also will recognize
his conclusion that terms-of-trade shocks should be accommodated,
at least to some degree. However, to me, the most important issue is
not whether there is a theoretical case for such accommodation.
Rather, it is whether there are likely to be any adverse effects on infla-
tion expectations and credibility from doing so. Even if we explain
that our intention is only to accommodate the first-round effect of a
major adverse terms-of-trade shock—such as the recent rise in oil
prices—and not any second-round effects, can we be sure that house-
holds and firms will behave appropriately and that medium-term
inflation expectations will remain anchored? At present, that is not
something the literature helps us answer. But given the potential costs
of restoring credibility once it is lost, it may be better to err on the
side of caution.312 Charles Bean
Overall, the changes wrought by globalization seem to have
supported the pursuit of low and stable inflation in the industrialized
economies, even if the mechanisms have been more subtle than the
popular view of the role of China and the other industrializing coun-
tries suggests. But globalization also has created tensions at the
microeconomic level in the shape of growing protectionist pressures
in the adversely affected sectors and at the macroeconomic level in the
form of global current account imbalances. These still have the poten-
tial to upset the apple cart. So, let me conclude with a couple of
pertinent Chinese proverbs: “There is no everlasting banquet under
the sun,” and “Good luck seldom comes in pairs, but troubles never
walk alone.” Policymakers may do well to remember them.
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Endnote
1In these models, the more complete risk spreading associated with international
capital market integration also flattens the output-inflation tradeoff because it
attenuates the wealth effect of demand shocks on labor supply. The empirical signif-
icance of this channel is debatable, however.
 